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THE WRIGHT PATENT WARS AND
EARLY AMERICAN AVIATION
HERBERT A. JOHNSON*
WA7rITING IN Poor Richard's Almanack in 1742, Benjamin
Franklin provided a good vignette about the expenses and
frustrations that would bedevil airplane manufacturers at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. He wrote:
In my travels I once saw a Sign call'd The Two Men at Law; One of
them was painted on one Side, in a melancholy posture, all in
Rags with this Scroll, I have lost my Cause. The other was capering
for Joy, on the other Side, with these Words, I have gain'd my Suit,
but he was stark naked.'
Litigation is always expensive, but federal cases filed to defend
U.S. patents against infringement have always been far more
costly than most other judicial matters. This was particularly the
case when the Wright airplane patent was litigated between 1909
and 1917. A 1918 truce was negotiated through the establish-
ment of a patent pool among the leading airplane manufactur-
ers, midwifed by the federal government intent upon increased
wartime production of aircraft. Franklin's caricature might well
be descriptive of the Wright Brothers, their successor compa-
nies, and those who opposed them. In 1914, the Wrights ap-
peared to have won in the courts, but by that time they had
forfeited any hope of preeminence in airframe manufacturing.
Ostensibly, Curtiss and his companies lost to the Wrights, but
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the Curtiss interests emerged as the major supplier of airplanes
to the American Army and Navy in 1916 and thereafter.
Maintaining patent rights through litigation can be so expen-
sive that unless it is funded by rapidly expanding production of
the invention, the patent holder can be bankrupted by litigation
costs alone. 2 Roy Knabenshue, a one-time exhibition pilot for
the Wrights, recalled that Orville Wright once estimated that he
had spent $152,000. Glenn Curtiss some years thereafter stated
that he had expended about $175,000.1 This was not an isolated
phenomenon. Lee De Forest, the inventor of the vacuum radio
tube amplifier, successfully defended his invention against in-
fringements, but the litigation costs drove him into bankruptcy.
Testifying before a 1914 Congressional committee, a patent at-
torney stressed the financial dangers of litigating patent rights.
He told of one client who attempted to defend an infringement
action, but lost. His opponent received little for his trouble
since the expenses of the lost suit had depreciated the in-
fringer's assets to the point that only $25,000 was available to
satisfy the $350,000 judgment entered against him. The same
lawyer prosecuted another infringement case, and won after
fourteen years and a successful appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court. Nevertheless, his victorious client was ruined fi-
nancially and out of business; the losing infringer was
flourishing. This theme was echoed by Thomas Edison, the in-
ventor of the incandescent light bulb. He claimed that he made
no money from this invention because every time he caught an
infringer and was ready to sue, the infringer went out of
business.4
The Wrights and the Wright Company invested substantial
amounts of time and money in their patent infringement ac-
tions.5 The cost of professional legal services is reflected in
2 FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 12, 29-30, 265 (Greenwood Press
1977) (1956).
3 Pooling of Patents: Hearing on H.R. 4523 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 74th
Cong. 115 (1936) (Knabenshue testimony, Feb. 25, 1935) [hereinafter Pooling of
Patents].
4 Id. at 874 (Waldemar Kaempffert testimony, Dec. 6, 1935); FLOYD L.
VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 187 (1925); VAUGHAN, supra note 2,
at 265.
5 In the years 1909-1912, the patent litigation was the greatest drain on the
Wright brothers' time, with Wilbur assuming most responsibility for this activity.
TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOP'S BoYs: A LIFE OF WILBUR AND ORVILLE WRIGHT 447
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Harry Toulmin's January 2, 1910, letter to Wilbur Wright. As
the Wright's attorney, Toulmin pointed out that the most eco-
nomical way to handle fees would be through the advancement
of a $12,000 per annum yearly retainer to his firm. At the rate
of $12,000 per annum for the first two years, and $10,000 per
year for the following five years, Toulmin could be released so
that most of his time could be dedicated to Wright litigation.
Four days later the Wrights rejected the proposal, but the fact
that such a substantial sum was suggested is strong evidence that
patent litigation constituted a major portion of Wright Com-
pany business and that each case represented a large investment
of funds.6
The saga of the Wright patent litigation is a complex account
that may never be known in its entirety, but the main outlines
are set forth in Part I. Part II examines the historical situation of
American patent law at the time of the Wright patent litigation,
and Part III considers the resulting patent pool arrangement
and its economic consequences.
I. SECURING U.S. AND EUROPEAN PATENTS
A. THE WRIGHT'S BAsic UNITED STATES PATENT (1906)
The basic United States patent covering the Wrights' control
system was applied for after the successful 1902 glider experi-
ments at Kitty Hawk. Absent the drafting skills of a patent attor-
ney, this application was rejected fairly rapidly. Filed on March
23, 1903, it covered only their glider control system, and the
patent examiner rejected their invention as "inoperative." He
dismissed the twisted bicycle tire box exhibit concerning wing
warping as being of "no assistance. 7 Wisely, the brothers de-
cided that professional help was needed. At the suggestion of
their local attorney, John Kirby, they contacted Harry A. Toul-
min of Springfield, Ohio, who in January 1904 undertook re-
6 Letters from Harry A. Toulmin, attorney for the Wright Company, to Wright
Company (Jan. 2, 1910), and Wright Company to Harry A. Toulmin (Jan. 24,
1910) (on file in container 53, Wright Brothers Papers, Library of Congress).
7 This involved a demonstration of the warping technique by twisting the two
ends of a long cardboard box in opposite directions; it was claimed to have been
the manner in which the Wrights initially discovered the use of wing twisting to
secure lateral stability. FRED C. KELLY, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS: A BIOGRAPHY Au-
THORIZED BY ORVILLE WRIGHT 112 (1950).
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sponsibility for further processing of the application.'
Toulmin's first effort on their behalf, in what would become at
least three decades of patent applications and infringement ac-
tions, trials and settlements, was to amend the original patent
application. This permitted the Wrights to include the powered
airplane as well as the 1902 glider. By May 1905, the examiner
conceded that the amended application "disclosed patentable
matter," even though he again rejected it.
Further amendment in December 1905 resulted in the exam-
iner holding that the application applied to a powered flying
aircraft, rather than a glider. Toulmin had argued the inven-
tion applied to both types of aircraft. Eventually, in March 1906,
the new matter was withdrawn, with a careful reservation of
rights that might otherwise be precluded from a subsequent ap-
plication by a concept known as "file wrapper estoppel." The
danger was that when Toulmin withdrew the powered airplane
provisions from the application, it might be asserted later that
deletion would imply that the Wrights had admitted the applica-
tion did not apply to aircraft with motors. In patent practice,
the files and records in the Patent Office constitute the princi-
pal documentary evidence in a subsequent infringement action.
Admissions by the patentee in the course of application may es-
top him from offering contrary testimony in an infringement
case. Furthermore, once a patentee has been granted a patent,
he cannot claim that a subsequent patent on the same invention
is valid.9 Ultimately, the Wright brothers' 1906 United States
patent was held to cover a "pioneering" invention, and as such,
was broadly construed to include gliders as well as powered air-
planes. In addition, it protected not only specific devices but
also a "combination" of wing-warping and a movable vertical
rudder. It also was construed to cover an alternative control sys-
tem based upon rigid wings and freely operating between-the-
wings ailerons10
8 See THE PAPERS OF WILBUR AND ORVILLE WRIGHT 417, 498 (Martin W. MacFar-
land, ed. 1953) [hereinafter WRIGHT PAPERS]; see also Rodney K. Worrel, The
Wright Brother's Pioneer Patent, 65 A.B.A. JOURNAL 1512, 1512, 1514, 1516 (1979).
9 Worrel, supra note 8, at 1517-18. On these various implications see WILLIAM
C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 250 (1890).
10 Worrel, supra note 8, at 1518. The fixed wing and between-the-wing aileron
arrangement was characteristic of the Curtiss aircraft designs. The decision
awarding "pioneering" status is discussed infra notes 23-33.
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B. EUROPEAN PATENTS (1904)
However, even as the American patent application was on the
verge of success, proceedings in the Imperial German patent of-
fice ground to a halt. This was not unexpected. For some time
the Wrights feared that Octave Chanute, a friend who also was
involved in aeronautical experiments, disclosed aspects of their
experiments to European audiences as early as 1903. Ruefully,
Wilbur Wright observed, "We had been congratulating ourselves
that this had been overlooked by [the German patent office].
... We fear it may interfere with our being granted a broad
claim on twisting the wings." 1 Thereafter, they ventured the
hope that the difference between "distort" and "twist" might
work to their benefit, with Wilbur naively commenting, "I think
we will succeed unless the German examiner is unreasonable
and stubborn."12 Apparently he was both, because he rejected
the application. Harry Toulmin and associated German patent
counsel managed to reverse that decision, but German courts
thereafter applied a narrow construction to the German Wright
patent, which afforded no protection to wing-warping, an essen-
tial part of the Wrights' control system. 3
Their patent applications in Britain and France proved to be
less troublesome. French patent 342,188 was issued on March
22, 1904. Eventually, it formed the basis for Wright Company
litigation in French courts against the major French manufac-
turers-Voison, Breguet, Caudron, Morane-Saulnier, and Spad.
In 1920, the newspapers estimated that several million dollars
would be payable in settlement of that litigation. 4 For the as-
signment of their rights to the German Wright Company
(Flugmaschine Wright Gesellschaft), the Wrights received
200,000 marks in cash, a block of stock, and 10 percent royalties
on all flying machines marketed in Germany, Luxembourg, Tur-
key, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.15 British law required that
a patent be put to practical use or it would lapse for non-use.
The Wrights were awarded British patent 6732 AD 1904, but
they waited until January 1913 to establish the British Wright
11 WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 8, at 481.
12 Id. at 482.
13 See infra note 49.
14 Orville Wright, affidavit draft, Wright Aeronautical Corp. v. United Aircraft Engi-
neering Corp., circa 1920 (on file in container 81, Wright Brothers Papers, Library
of Congress).
15 FRED HowARD, WILBUR AND ORVILLE:'A BIOGRAPHY OF THE WRIGHT BROTHERS
319 (1987).
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Company. To that company, Orville Wright assigned his and his
brother's rights under the British patent, and in return received
a shareholder's proportion of the 15,000 pounds sterling the
British government paid for a Crown license.1 6 This license au-
thorized the British government to engage in experimentation
and aircraft construction free from the risk of a patent infringe-
ment action. Securing these European patehts and entering into
licensing arrangements cost the Wrights both time and money,
but the proceeds from license sales were substantial.
C. EARLY STEPS TO SECURE ECONOMIC BENEFITS
OF THE PATENTS
Economists point out that while patents have value, the inven-
tors or capitalists associated with them, must be capable of fi-
nancing large scale production of pioneering inventions if
substantial profits are to be realized. One patent attorney
surmised that it normally takes six years to perfect the invention
for the market, six years to amortize the costs of the project, and
the remaining five or six years are available to obtain a profit.
17
Most patentees must attract investment capital, and in the case
of the Wright Company, the enterprise was bedeviled by a preoc-
cupation with secrecy, the maintenance of too small a labor
force, and failure to convert a single plane hand-craft manufac-
tory into an assembly production line.1
8
Significantly, the Wrights moved forward to assemble capital
and prepare for mass airplane production in Europe. The
United Kingdom patent system required patentees to take
prompt steps toward production and exploitation of their inven-
tions, while in the United States, a patentee was under no simi-
lar obligation. In 1906, the year in which they received their
U.S. patent, the Wrights developed a strategy for marketing
their patent rights to European syndicates. Their preferred
compensation was a combination of cash, shares of corporate
stock, and royalties on airplane sales. In addition to licensing
16 Brief for Plaintiff on motion for preliminary injunction, Wright Aeronautical
Co. v. Handley-Page, Ltd., Dec. 3, 1920 (on file with Library of Congress in
container 81 of Wright Brothers Papers); Letter from Toulmin to Wright Broth-
ers, Mar. 5, 1908, (on file with Library of Congress in folio Toulmin, container
53, Wright Brothers Papers). Prior to 1913, the Wrights had an agreement with a
syndicate established by the Short brothers in England, which became the princi-
pal European supplier of the Wright flyers. See infra notes 18, 19.
17 HARRY A. TOULMIN, JR., PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 28 (1939).
18 VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at 152; VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 29.
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the syndicates, the Wrights would provide the syndicates with
publicity through demonstration flights. They would also train
pilots and provide technical support as the licensees began their
production. This financial plan was developed in conjunction
with Charles R. Flint & Co., a New York firm of bankers and
promoters. 19 During 1908 and 1909, under the guidance of the
Flint's European representative, the Wrights entered into a con-
tract with the Lazare Weiller syndicate in France and the Short
Brothers (Oswald, Horace and Eustace) in Britain. Their initial
efforts in Britain were aided by Charles Rolls, then launching his
automobile factory in partnership with Henry Royce, another
Wright supporter. By 1910, the high quality of the Short Broth-
ers' airplanes convinced the Wrights to designate the Short firm
their sole representative in Britain.2"
Following receipt of their basic U.S. patent in 1906, the
Wright Brothers seem to have hesitated in making American fi-
nancial connections that would have facilitated putting their in-
vention into marketable production. American aviation
enthusiasts toyed with the possibility of buying a license among
themselves. In 1908, the Aero Club of America launched an un-
successful funding drive to purchase U.S. rights to the Wright
patent and to place the invention in the public domain. Wilbur
Wright indicated that they would be willing to release their
rights in the patent if a sum of $100,000 were secured by this
funding initiative. Within six months of the initial solicitation
only $11,000 had been collected, and the effort was aban-
doned. 1 Since the Aero Club membership consisted of several
industrialists and financiers, it is surprising that more domestic
investment was not forthcoming. For the Wrights, the situation
must have been disheartening, given the fact that German pub-
lic subscription drives to fund Zeppelin construction were, dur-
ing the same time period, raising financial support equivalent to
millions of U.S. dollars.22
D. DEFENDING THE WRIGHT PATENT IN U.S. COURTS
Despite the Wright's apparent willingness to negotiate con-
cerning their U.S. patent rights in 1908, it is clear that both
19 Short Brothers and Wright Brothers, 1903-1978, Seventy Years of Powered Dynamic
Flight, 175 WORLD WAR I AERO: THE JOURNAL OF THE EARLY AIRPLANE 18 (2002).
20 Id. at 18-19, 20-21, 22, 24.
21 HOWARD, supra note 15, at 327.
22 See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, WINGLESS EAGLE: U.S. ARMY AVIATION THROUGH
WORLD WAR I 13-18, 52-55, 82-83 (2001).
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Glenn Curtiss and the Aerial Experimental Association (AEA) of
Alexander Graham Bell on one side, and the Wrights on the
other, were already preparing to litigate the Wright patent's va-
lidity and scope. During the March 1908 test flight of the AEA
Red Wing, Alexander Graham Bell emphasized to his colleagues
the need for a complete photographic record of ,their work,
both to aid future designers and to forestall possible patent com-
plications. In July 1908, Orville Wright wrote to Curtiss concern-
ing a newer AEA model, the June Bug, and, after noting the
adjustable wing tips, offered to negotiate license terms under
the Wrights' U.S. patent. When Curtiss advised them that he
did not expect to use the plane for commercial purposes, the
Wrights raised no objections, but when the June Bug was used
for compensated exhibition flying they renewed their demand.
Bell's patent attorneys entered the picture shortly after the first
successful flight of the June Bug in July 1908.23 It was Curtiss's
success in prize competition during the summer of 1909 which
triggered the Wrights' first patent action filed against the Her-
ring-Curtiss Company.
Formed three months before the litigation began, Herring-
Curtiss merged the patent interests and resources of Glenn Cur-
tiss and Augustus Herring. Wright v. Herring-Curtiss proved to be
decisive in establishing the Wrights' impregnable legal position.
Litigation began in late 1909 when the Wrights asked the courts
to issue a preliminary injunction against the Herring-Curtiss
Company, Glenn Curtiss, and Augustus Herring. Such an order
for injunctive relief would prevent Herring-Curtiss from manu-
facturing airplanes until patent rights were determined. On
January 3, 1910, United States District Judge John R. Hazel, sit-
ting in the Western District of New York, issued a preliminary
injunction and wrote a strong opinion upholding the Wright
patent.24 Four months later the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed Judge Hazel and dissolved the injunc-
tion on a procedural technicality. 25 However, the substantive
basis for Judge Hazel's District Court decision-that the Wright
brothers had discovered a method for controlling lateral roll
and that in doing so they had made a pioneering contribution
23 It is very likely that Curtiss's restraint in not flying the June Bug for compen-
sation earlier was based upon the cautionary advice of Bell and his attorneys.
HowARD, supra note 15, 234-38.
24 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co. (Wright I), 177 F. 257, 260-61
(C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910), rev'd 180 F. 110 (C.CA. 2d 1910).
25Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co. (Wright II), 180 F. 110 (C.CA. 2d 910).
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to the state-of-the-art in aviation-would dominate subsequent
litigation. His holding that the Wrights were pioneers entitled
them to a broad and liberal interpretation of their patent
claims.26
Within three years, broad construction of the Wright patent
was applied once more when further proceedings took place in
Wright Company v. Herring-Curtiss Company.27 Predictably, Judge
Hazel's opinion was in favor of the Wrights and most encourag-
ing to their chances for success. As before, he stressed the press-
ing need to solve the. problem of insuring lateral stability of
airplanes in flight. Conceding that Samuel Langley, Otto Lilien-
thal, Octave Chanute, and Hudson Maxim had made great pro-
gress in this task, the judge pointed out that all of these
experiments ended in failure. Even the published theories of
Chanute "were not sufficiently definite to suggest the later im-
provements by the patentees. ' 2 From the Henson patent issued
in Britain in 1842, to the most recent European patents, the spe-
cific combination of wing-warping features and a vertical rudder
was not present as a unified proposal for controlled aerial flight.
An 1868 British patent demonstrated the inventor's grasp of the
mechanics of air in controlling a flying machine and incorpo-
rated some of the features later used by the Wrights. However,
as Judge Hazel pointed out, the "assertions and suggestions were
altogether too conjectural to teach others how to reduce them
to practice, and therefore his patent is not anticipatory. 29
Since the Curtiss airplanes used a separately controlled verti-
cal rudder, there was considerable legal argument over the orig-
inality of their modification of the Wright vertical rudder which
was linked to the wing-warping controls. In this instance, Judge
Hazel held that the vertical rudder was an essential part of the
Wright invention, which in concert with the wing-warping sys-
tem, secured lateral stability in flight.30 However, in the Wright
airplane, the use of flexible wings which permitted the wing an-
gle of attack to be altered (or warped) was also an essential part
26 Wright 1, 177 F. at 260-61; WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 8, at 907, 909, 911;
ALDEN HATCH, GLENN CURTISS: PIONEER OF NAVAL AvIATION 128-30, 144, 176-77,
180, 184-86 (1942); KELLY, supra note 7, 288, 293; CLARA STUDER, SKY STORMING
YANKEE: THE LIFE OF GLENN CURTISS 98 (1937).
27 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co. (Wright III), 204 F. 597, 597-614
(D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1913), affd per curiam 211 F 597, 654-55 (2d Cir. 1914) (Wright
IV); see also HATCH, supra note 26, at 232.
28 Wright IV, 204 F. at 601.
29 Id. at 603.
30 Id. at 601, 603.
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of their machine. It did not matter that the Herring-Curtiss
wings were rigid and another method was utilized to alter the
angle of incidence. Applying the doctrine of equivalents
broadly, Judge Hazel stated that "[t]he employment, in a
changed form, of the warping feature or its equivalent by an-
other, even though better effects or results are obtained, does
not avoid infringement. 3 1
Turning to the vertical rudder, Judge Hazel found it a valid
sub-combination within the overall Wright scheme for obtaining
stability in flight.3 2 Although it was not directly connected to
the movable ailerons of the Curtiss airplane, the vertical rudder
was shown by testimony to have at least occasional use in coun-
tering aerodynamic forces generated by changing the angle of
incidence of one wing surface. Testimony concerning the use of
the Wright and Curtiss vertical rudder was provided by both
Army and Navy aviators, including Lieutenant Thomas DeW.
Milling, who had flown both types of airplanes.33
In his 1913 opinion, Judge Hazel again held the Wrights to be
"pioneer inventors in the aeroplane art;" he observed that the
Wrights' "concept was practical and their combination of old
and new elements meritoriously advanced the operatives of
aeroplanes of this type from which astonishing flights have re-
sulted. ' 34 With an eye toward the confused legal definition of a
"pioneer inventor," he then commented, "even if the patentees
were not strictly pioneers, . . . they nevertheless strikingly sur-
passed their predecessors . . . and are entitled to a liberal con-
struction of their claims in controversy.31 5 A pioneer invention
was defined as one that covered a function never before per-
formed, through the creation of a wholly novel device, or one of
such novelty and importance that it marked a distinct step for-
ward in the progress of the art; it could not be a mere improve-
31 Id. at 607. See discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, infra note 51.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 608-12.
34 Id. at 605.
35 Id. at 606. Subsequent to his 1910 decision, Judge Hazel may have read the
reversal on similar issues of DistrictJudge Charles Hough, sitting in the Southern
District of New York. Hough decided that a patent for a motorcar was of "pio-
neering" status, only to be reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. Electric Vehicle Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 172 F. 923 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1909), reversed by Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C.A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 916 (C.C.A.
2d 1911).
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ment or perfection of what had gone before.3 6 Judge Hazel was
affirmed by a per curium opinion which expressly held the
Wrights to be pioneers.3 7 Following this decision, Orville
Wright observed: "This will give us an absolute monopoly..."3
He was mistaken. A monopoly is the elimination of economic
competition; as such, it cannot be won in the court room. In-
deed, it can be argued that when the Wrights were victorious in
the courtroom in 1914, they had already lost the economic bat-
tie being waged in the aircraft factories of the United States.
Following their success against the Herring-Curtiss Company,
the Wrights turned their attention to infringing exhibition avia-
tors. Exhibition flying was popular with civilian dare devils, who
sought monetary prizes as well as international reputations for
flying skill and daring. Since many of the exhibition aircraft
were built by Glenn Curtiss's firm or other manufacturers unli-
censed by the Wrights, the Dayton firm sought injunctive relief
and infringement damages against the exhibition pilots. These
actions, filed against foreign aviators as well as against Ameri-
cans, aroused severe criticism in the aviation community and the
public at large. While exhibition and contest flying was profita-
ble, it had even greater value in demonstrating new develop-
ments in airframe construction, engine development, and
piloting skill. In pursuing a vigorous prosecution approach to
their U.S. patent rights, the Wrights virtually isolated American
aviation from knowledge of rapid European improvement of air-
plane design and manufacture. 9
36 Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, at 561-62 (1898).
Boyden was a 5-4 decision that turned upon whether the invention was "pioneer-
ing." The majority held that the invention was entitled to liberal construction,
but that it was not of "pioneering" quality. In 1912, it was held that to be a pio-
neering invention, the theory that was expounded in the patent application had
to be put to use. Manhattan Book Casing Machine Co. v. E.C. Fuller Co., 274 F.
964, 969 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912).
37 Wright IV, 211 F. at 655.
38 WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 8, at 1073.
39 The first actions, filed in 1910, were against aviators Louis Paulhan and
Claude Grahame-White. The Grahame-White litigation, based on a 1910 exhibi-
tion flight at Belmont Park, N.Y., was settled for $17,000 in May 1911. Wilbur
Wright indicated displeasure that his attorneys had permitted Grahame-White to
pay so little in settlement of damages. Letters from Harry A. Toulmin, attorney
to Wilbur and Orville Wright, Jan 2, 1910, Feb. 18, 1910, May 13, 1911, May 26,
1911 (on file with Library of Congress in folio Toulmin, container 53, Wright
Brothers Papers). Grover Loening wrote Orville Wright that there was resent-
ment that the Wright Company allowed flying events to occur, and decided
whether to sue after the exhibition had been staged. Letter from Grover Loen-
ing to Wilbur Wright, July 5, 1914 (on file with Library of Congress, folio Loen-
2004]
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Bringing infringement suits against foreign aviators met an-
other complication. Given the cross country tours of non-U.S.
pilots, it was not easy to serve them with legal process before
they moved on to another state or U.S. judicial district. It was
also difficult to determine which courts might accept jurisdic-
tion over infringement petitions. Harry Toulmin and the
Wright Company came to the conclusion that they should sue
the producers and promoters of the exhibitions and contests,
rather than attempt to locate and serve the foreign pilots. That
was a practical legal solution, but a disastrous decision for public
relations and economic well-being. In attacking the American
sponsors of the contests, as well as those who provided assistance
to foreign aviators, the Wrights alienated those members of the
business community who were most enthusiastic about flying.
As matters turned out, the Wright Company would soon need
all the financial support it could get, and the loss of the friend-
ship of American promoters in an effort to curtail exhibition
flying was counterproductive in the long run.40
One of the major cases against an exhibition pilot was the
early suit brought by the Wrights against the French aviator,
Louis Paulhan, in the United States Circuit Court for the South-
ern District of New York.41 The opinion in the case is important
because the issues did not involve a variant method of altering
the airfoil camber (the main issue in Herring-Curtiss), but rather
a different mode of maintaining stability through use of a rud-
der. District Judge Learned Hand recognized that there were
mechanical differences between the Curtiss planes and those of
the Wrights, but he insisted that the Wright patent involved
more than mere mechanics. Rather, it was the concept of ob-
taining lateral equilibrium through alterations in the angle of
incidence of the airfoils and balancing deflections of the rudder
ing, container 38, Wright Brothers Papers). See also discussion HowARD, supra
note 15, at 347; CROUCH, supra note 5, at 418-19.
40 On the matter of securing jurisdiction of foreign exhibition fliers, and of
suing their promoters and managers, see letters from Harry A. Toulmin, attorney
to Wilbur and Orville Wright, Dec. 18,1909, Dec. 19, 1909, Feb, 19, 1910 (on file
with Library of Congress in folio Toulmin, container 53, Wright Brothers
Papers).
41 Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). At this time, the U.S.
circuit courts were the initial trial courts for many actions, but they were held by
U.S. district judges, sitting either singly or in association with other district
judges. Appeals from circuit court decisions were taken to the circuit court of
appeals for the appropriate circuit; from the circuit courts of appeal, cases could,
in most instances, be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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to the left or right. As Judge Hand observed, "the invention is
not of a machine, it is not an invention of this means of so turn-
ing a rudder, but it is an invention of a combination of which
this action of the rudder is a part. '42 Paulhan's counsel argued
that the Wrights' invention was a mere improvement over the
existing state-of-the-art. As a consequence, Judge Hand devoted
considerable attention to that argument in writing his opinion.
He specifically concluded that Clarence Ader of France had
come close to anticipating the Wright invention, but rejected
the idea that Ader was entitled to priority because he had
merely suggested that a rudder might help lateral control.43
Echoing the rationale of Judge Hazel's opinion in Herring-Cur-
tiss, Judge Hand reasoned that it was the use and combination of
previously discovered techniques that resulted in the Wrights'
pioneer discovery.44 Since exhibition flying was widely practiced
throughout the United States it would have been impossible to
sue every aviator who flew an unlicensed machine, or even to
litigate with every promoter and sponsor of exhibitions. That
being the case, the Wrights recognized that bringing a small
number of suits would encourage many would-be infringers to
avoid litigation and obtain licenses before staging their exhibi-
tions. Because the key element was surprise, they were careful
not to signal in advance whether they would bring a suit for in-
junctive relief. As a consequence the aviation world was kept
guessing, American spectators were deprived of their entertain-
ment, and the engineering progress was severely restricted.
Should an exhibition aviator and his backers wish to comply
with the law, the Wrights struck a hard bargain. In some cases,
issuance of an exhibition license was based upon their receipt of
one-third of the gate proceeds, and they insisted that their con-
tractual claim take priority over the claims of the sponsors who
provided risk capital to launch the exhibition.45
Infringement actions against contest and exhibition flyers
generated animosity toward Wright interests in the aeronautical
community and the general public. On July 5, 1914, Wright em-
ployee Grover C. Loening informed Orville Wright that there
42 Id. at 264.
43 Id. at 269-70.
- Id. at 261-71. See also John A. Eubank, Aeronautical Patent Law, 56 DICK. L.
REv. 143, 145 (1952).
- See the negotiations conducted on behalf of the Wrights with the Aero Cor-
poration, Ltd. (on file with Library of Congress in container 75, Wright Brothers
Papers).
2004]
34 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE [69
was strong feeling against Orville at the contest races. Many
spoke kindly about U.S. infringers for their successful defiance
of Wright litigation threats, and displeasure with the Wright
Company was widespread. Loening specifically suggested that
Wright and his company could regain goodwill with the public if
they would announce in advance that they would not bring an
infringement action against a particular event that they had de-
cided to overlook.46
Such a gesture would be contrary to Orville Wright's state of
mind in 1914, demonstrated by an exchange of correspondence
between him and Colonel Samuel Reber of the Signal Corps. In
January 1914, Reber wrote to Orville asking what position the
Wright Company would take in regard to the Army purchasing
replacement parts for Curtiss aircraft already in the Army's in-
ventory. He assured Wright that the Army did not intend to
purchase any new machines that might in any way infringe the
Wright patent. Reber had long relied upon the Wrights for ad-
vice and support, perhaps to the detriment of his career, but in
this instance he received little assurance from Dayton, Ohio.
Orville stated that the Wright board of directors had not de-
cided what to do about aircraft that were already in use but in
violation of the Wright patent. However, he rather ungraciously
suggested that the Signal Corps should recover its losses from
the bond that it had required of unlicensed manufacturers.47
Given the substantial testimonial support Army aviators had
given to the Wright Company in the infringement litigation,
Orville Wright's attitude appears to have been unduly harsh and
ungrateful. Indeed, it suggests that more than mere legal advan-
tage or financial gain was involved in the Wright patent
litigation.
E. THE PERSONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
WRIGHT PATENT LITIGATION
Winning an infringement action against Glenn Curtiss meant
a great deal to Orville Wright beyond the monopoly he antici-
pated. It was what Wilbur Wright had worked at diligently until
his death in 1912, and quite possibly Orville blamed the Curtiss
46 Letter from Grover Loening to Orville Wright, July 5, 1914 (on file with
Library of Congress, folio Loening, container 38, Wright Brothers Papers).
47 Letters from Samuel Reber to Orville Wright, Jan. 14, 1914; Orville Wright
to Samuel Reber, Jan. 17, 1914, (on file with Library of Congress in folio Reber,
container 46, Wright Brothers Papers).
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infringement case for Wilbur's illness and death. In 1935, Frank
H. Russell, an early Wright employee and subsequent leader in
the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association, told a Congressional
committee:
The last 2 years of Mr. Wilbur Wright's life were devoted entirely
to his fight with Curtiss on patent matters. I was the first man-
ager of the Wright Company. I joined them in 1909 and was with
them until 1911. Throughout the formative period, when we
built the first airplanes, started the first exhibition business in
this country, Orville Wright did all of the work, because Wilbur
Wright had to devote himself, if you please, to patent suits. Wil-
bur Wright died of typhoid fever because he worked himself to
death fighting a patent suit.48
Orville Wright, as the survivor, may well have been driven to
greater legal efforts by the need to carry out the task to which
Wilbur dedicated his last years. He also inherited a good share
of the tenacity characteristic of his father, Bishop Milton Wright,
who proved to be an indefatigable leader of factional strife in
the United Brethren of Christ Church. The Bishop was not
above urging his followers to take resort to the civil courts while
resolving church disputes. 49
The Wright brothers, and Orville after Wilbur's death in
1912, had ample cause to be bitter against many of their oppo-
nents in litigation over patent rights. When Orville lay close to
death from his injuries in the September 1908 crash that killed
Army Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge, Alexander Graham Bell
and other members of the Aerial Experimental Association
walked into the hanger at Fort Myer to measure the remains of
the wrecked Wright flyer. Who could tell how much that had
helped in the AEA's improvement of the June Bug?5"
Orville Wright continued to suffer from injuries he sustained
in those 1908 Army trials. As a consequence, he was unable to
sit or stand for extended periods of time, and found most meth-
ods of travel to be extremely debilitating. Although he contin-
ued to receive national recognition as the inventor of the first
48 POOLING OF PATENTS (Russell testimony, Dec. 4, 1935), supra note 3, at 777;
see also Tom D. Crouch, Blaming Wilbur and Orville: The Wright Patent Suits and the
Growth of American Aeronautics, ATMOSPHERiC FLIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
289 (Peter Galison and Alex Roland, eds., 2000).
49 CROUCH, supra note 5, at 40-43, 60-62, 215-18. Bishop Wright died on Apr.
3, 1917, shortly before the establishment of the aircraft patent pool and the U.S.
declaration of war. Id. at 479.
50 Id. at 372-75, 379-80; HowARD, supra note 15, at 278.
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powered heavier-than-air flying machine, his physical limitations
and natural tendency toward seclusion began to isolate him
from other participants in early aviation. That isolating process
was accelerated in 1910, when the Wright Company filed the
first of many infringement actions against European aviators
who staged exhibitions in the United States with machines not
under license by the Wrights. There may have been even more
satisfaction in beating Augustus Herring at law, for this scoun-
drel had worked his way into observing the 1902 Kitty Hawk
glider experiments, and used his information in 1908 to bid
against the Wrights for the Army contract. He also misled
Glenn Curtiss, assuring him that he held aviation patents prior
in date to the 1906 Wright patent. In fact, not only did Herring
not own any airplane patents, he had not built any airplanes
except toy models that he sold to children.51 Curtiss discovered
Herring's lies in the course of the infringement litigation, and
Herring-Curtiss was bankrupt before the 1914 decree was en-
tered. Glenn Curtiss managed to survive financially, continuing
to do business as the Curtiss Aeroplane Company, and subse-
quently, as the Curtiss Motor Company.
5 2
Herring was introduced to the Wrights by a mutual friend,
Octave Chanute. It was Chanute who urged the Wrights to de-
sist from filing infringement suits, and it was also Chanute who
was responsible for prior disclosure of technical details concern-
ing the 1902 glider experiments. The Wrights suspected that
Chanute was guilty of assisting the Herring-Curtiss Company
during the course of the litigation. They also resented
Chanute's 1903 inferences to the French scientific commu-
nity-asserting that the Wrights were his proteg6s.
53
Even more irksome was Curtiss's rebuilding of the 1903 Lang-
ley flier under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institution. This
was done to undermine the court's decision in the Herring-Cur-
tiss case by demonstrating that Langley's flier was able to fly in
1903. Since the Langley flier had crashed a few days before the
successful Wright flight at Kitty Hawk, this would have seriously
challenged the basis for the court's judgment for the Wrights.
Unfortunately for the perpetrators of this subterfuge, Orville
Wright acquired complete information concerning the "im-
51 C[ECIL] R. ROSEBERRY, GLENN CURTISS: PIONEER OF FLIGHT 237-39 (1991).
52 Id. at 152-53, 156-57, 164, 178-80, 189-90, 237-39, 256-59; CROUCH, supra note
5, at 400-02; HowARD, supra note 15, at 308-11, 314, 316, 329.
53 JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 93-94.
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provements" that had been made in the control systems and the
motor, and stood ready to expose the ruse if either the Smithso-
nian Institution, or Dr. Alfred Zahm, its employee, attempted to
discredit the originality of the Wrights' invention. 4 The crea-
tion of a patent pool in July 1917 ended further attempts to re-
habilitate the Langley flier, or the reputation of its inventor.
Nevertheless, the incident alerted Orville Wright that the Smith-
sonian's officers, along with Alexander Graham Bell and Glenn
Curtiss, were determined to undermine the validity of the
Wright patent at all costs.
An interesting alignment of supporters, some for the Wrights
and others for Curtiss, complicated the relationships between
the Wrights and Curtiss enterprises. Glenn Curtiss profited
from his affiliation with Henry Ford, who had become the im-
placable enemy of all patent-based monopolies. This was in
large part due to Ford's earlier litigation with George Selden's
successors who had claimed priority in patenting the automo-
bile. Ford had retained W. Benton Crisp as his attorney in the
Selden case, and at his request, Crisp helped Curtiss in defend-
ing against the Wright infringement actions. Crisp had won
against Selden's successors by pointing out that Ford used a four
cylinder combustion engine, which distinguished his motor car
from the two cylinder engine utilized in Selden's patented auto-
mobile.55 In a similar vein, Crisp advised Curtiss to operate sep-
arately the rear vertical rudders of his airplanes, taking
advantage of the fact that the Wrights'1909-14 suit against Her-
ring-Curtiss had not passed upon this particular Wright patent
claim.5 6 Dispirited by the apparent need to relitigate this aspect
of the patent, Orville Wright hesitated to challenge Crisp's strat-
egy, and Curtiss continued to produce airplanes while preparing
to base his defense upon differences in rudder controls. 57
54 WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 8, at 412-13, 984; CROUCH, supra note 5, at 253-
55, 276-77, 485-90; ROSEBERRY, supra note 51, at 381-93. In 1925, Orville Wright
told Chief Justice William Howard Taft that as early as 1910, he and Wilbur
Wright knew that the Smithsonian Institution could not be trusted to be impar-
tial when dealing with experiments conducted by Langley, a former Secretary of
the Smithsonian. However, even with this suspicion, they did not believe the
Smithsonian would protect the interests of private individuals pending in the
courts. Letter from Orville Wright to William Howard Taft, May 14, 1925 (on file
with Library of Congress in folio 1, container 84, Wright Brothers Papers).
55 ROSEBERRY, supra note 51, at 345-46.
56 Id. at 357-59.
57 Id. at 345-47; CROUCH, supra note 5, at 462-63.
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Curtiss's biographer, Cecil R. Roseberry, quoted Grover Loen-
ing's recollection that Orville Wright and his sister Katherine
considered the patent litigation the one great hate of their lives,
and that they talked of it constantly. He also noted that Holden
C. Richardson, at that time a young naval constructor, was re-
ceived coldly by Katherine Wright when he stayed overnight in
the Wrights' Dayton home. She knew that Richardson was a
friend and associate of Curtiss, and it was apparent to him that
she was very bitter about the litigation.58
F. EARLY AVIATION AND THE WRIGHT PATENT LITIGATION
Overall progress of aviation suffered from the inability, or un-
willingness, of the Wrights to exploit their patent rights and to
commence broad scale production of the airplane. Under nor-
mal conditions, the holder of a basic, or "pioneering" patent, is
the principal buyer of improvement patents. Some economists
argue that improvement patents cease to be awarded when the
market for those patent rights is limited or non-existent. In the
case of the airplane, the Wrights and their companies should
have been the major purchaser of improvement patents. How-
ever, their failure to develop industrial capacity, coupled with
their preoccupation with litigation, severely restricted their ca-
pacity to enter the market for improvement patents. The result-
ing meager market for airplane improvement patents
undoubtedly discouraged would-be inventors and slowed techni-
cal progress. At the same time, the Wrights, as holders of the
pioneering patent, had little incentive to develop or incorporate
improvements unless greater marketability justified the cost of
the re-tooling required to incorporate the change.59
Of course, this situation did not exist in Europe, where the
Wrights had already licensed syndicates to produce airplanes
under their foreign patents or sold licenses authorizing the es-
tablishment of government aircraft factories. In addition, it
should be recalled that German courts narrowly construed the
Wright patent, providing substantially less protection against
would-be infringers than was available under the pioneering
U.S. patent. These factors made aircraft production less litig-
ious in Europe, sparked rapid growth in manufacturing, and ex-
panded scientific research on aviation. In addition, virtually all
of the future combatants in World War I invested resources in
58 Id. at 342-43.
59 TOULMIN, supra note 17, at 13, 39, 52; VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 26.
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aviation that dwarfed the miserly appropriations made by the
United States Congress for the support of military and naval avi-
ation in the United States.60
A variant law and economics view concerning patents is
presented in Judge Richard A. Posner's discussion of patents
and antitrust theory. Posner argues that restriction or elimina-
tion of price competition is the essence of antitrust policy, and
that market forces will impose limitations upon the level of
prices a sole seller can demand. Merger of two competing firms
will not necessarily restrict competition unless those firms are
large enough to control virtually all of the market; the same can
be said of collusive pricing arrangements between two or more
competing firms. He argues that in this context, patents, al-
though ostensibly monopolistic, are not necessarily volative of
antitrust laws such as the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act. He as-
serts, "A patent is actually a poor proxy for monopoly power,
since most patents confer too little monopoly to be a proper
object of antitrust concern;" thus, he doubts the capacity of pat-
ents to diminish innovation, either by the patentee or by
others.6 1
Posner's conclusion concerning the limited monopolistic im-
pact of patents is, of course, a generalization, that may have less
application to basic, or "pioneering" discoveries than to mere
improvement patents. Arguably, a broad construction of a pio-
neering patent, carrying with itjudicial flexibility in applying the
doctrine of equivalents, is of substantial economic and monopo-
listic value. However, realization of gain, as distinct from advan-
tage, depends upon exploitation and improvement of the
invention. Regardless of the monopolistic price impact of the
patent itself, when a patent covers a pioneering invention, it will
exert an influence on markets for similar machines, whether or
not they infringe the pioneering patent. As Posner concedes,
the costs and delays in obtaining a patent and protecting the
invention from infringement are considerable, and for that rea-
son he argues that the holder of a patent may be encouraged to
work on improvements rather than suppress them.6 2 The histor-
ical evidence would indicate that the Wright Company failed to
60 For a brief survey of U.S. and foreign appropriations, see JOHNSON, supra
note 22, at 55-57, 170.
61 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ix, 3, 8, 15,
17, 28, 172, note 3 (quotation)(1976).
62 Id. at 15.
2004]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
pursue this path, 63 limiting its own profits from the airplane pat-
ent and also restricting its financial ability to purchase improve-
ment patents from others.
Other economists working on the relationship between tech-
nological change, patents, and capital investment have arrived
at conclusions that differ from Judge Posner. The careful analy-
sis of Jacob Schmookler, covering patented inventions and capi-
tal investment between 1837 and 1957, provides a strong
argument that unless there is already a substantial investment in
a product, there will be little, if any, time expended upon it by
inventors who subsequently enter the field. Following Schmook-
ler's reasoning, the failure of the U.S. government to appropri-
ate substantial funds for the support of military uses of aviation,
was primarily responsible for the decline in American aviation
engineering. Unfortunately, the aircraft industry is not in-
cluded in Schmookler's statistical tables. However, the construc-
tion of railroad equipment is part of his data base, and arguably
this area has enough similarity to aviation that the "investment
first" pattern may be applicable to aeronautical technology. 64
Schmookler commented,
[F] rom the standpoint of economics, invention is mainly an eco-
nomic activity. As in other economic activities, resources tend to
be allocated among its branches, and probably between it and
other classes of economic activity, in accord with profit expecta-
tions of net return.., the funds available for support of invention
in a given field, . . .are . . .likely to be positively associated with
the amount of economic activity in the field itself.65
The assumption of course, is that invention is an economic
activity. Yet we know that patent infringement actions in aero-
nautics were extremely expensive, and were sustained far be-
yond any reasonable hope for reward, either from increased
government contracts, or from any future patent pool. Joseph
Corn has pointed to the "Winged Gospel" as a quasi-religious
enthusiasm that swept turn of the century America, suggesting
that the behavior of the early inventors and aviators more closely
63 See discussion infra notes 61-73.
64 JACOB SCHMOOKLER, PATENTS, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE: DATA AND
SELECTED ESSAYS 72-77, 82 (1972).
65 Id. at 77. For this reason, he asserted that it was the profits to be realized
from the sale of new inventions which spurred inventors to invest time and funds
in their experiments. "The key event behind the appearance of a new product
therefore may often not be the invention of the product itself but the growth of
the potential demand for it." Id. at 82.
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paralleled that of religious fanatics than that of calculating busi-
nessmen.6 6 Otherwise, how many inventors would be inspired
to actually fly their new inventions to see if they worked? Why
would Curtiss ignore a growing motorcycle business to build and
fly airplanes, and experiment with new aviation engines? Were
these men in pursuit of riches or seeking self-satisfaction or
fame? What tangible rewards awaited Wilbur and Orville Wright
in 1902, or Glenn Curtiss and the Aerial Experiment Association
in 1908? Perhaps the connection between invention and capital
investment followed different rules in the aviation industry, and
thus, Schmookler's conclusions need to be applied with caution.
We know that contemporary observers believed that patent lit-
igation discouraged capital investment in aviation, and that it
also depressed experimentation. Shortly after the United States
entered World War I, a Congressman from Ohio asserted that
the unsettled legal status of the airplane patents hindered the
growth and development of the industry. In 1914, a New York
attorney active in aviation affairs claimed that patent litigation
made it impossible for manufacturers to attract capital. Wright
biographer Fred Howard asserted that the infant aviation indus-
try was "strangled by the umbilical cord" of the patent and ensu-
ing litigation.67 Attorney Willis Rice, testifying before a House
Committee in 1935, asserted that "[i]t is very difficult to per-
suade capital to buy into a law suit, no matter how roseate the
prospects."6 He continued that the enormous cost of litigating
patents, a sine que non to determining validity, was a serious
problem that enabled patent pools to crush independent inven-
tors, and that it discouraged members of the pool from continu-
ing and further refining their work.69 Writing in 1925,
economist Floyd Vaughan pointed to the 1912 hearings before
the House's Oldfield Committee, during which a scientist then
informed the congressmen,
Woe, indeed, to the poor inventor who tries to enforce his rights
against wealthy infringers, aided by skillful lawyers; his well-en-
66 JOSEPH J. CORN, THE WINGED GOSPEL: AMERICA'S ROMANCE WITH AvIATION,
1900-1950 (1983).
67 55 CONG. REC. H5123-24 (July 14, 1917) (statement of Rep. S.D. Fess); Let-
ter from Israel Ludlow to Capt. Washington I. Chambers, Dec. 1914 (on file with
Library of Congress in container 7, Aero Club of America Papers); HowARD,
supra note 15, at 346;JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 106, 115.
68 POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 573.
69 Id.
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graved United States patent parchment may then become his
certificate of entrance to the poor house or the lunatic asylum.
70
The emphasis upon the economically "poor" independent in-
ventor may be attributable to more than mere sentimentality.
Jacob Schmookler's data reflected that in industries other than
aviation it was the small independent inventor who was most
likely to make significant discoveries, and such inventors tended
to avoid association with large firms. He also posited the view
that it was operating personnel who made far more discoveries
of importance than engineering experts or other laboratory-situ-
ated employees. Yet when such an independent or small firm
inventor hit upon something new, his engineering bosses or
competitor large firms tended to belittle the discovery, and
joined ranks to make the newcomer unwelcome.71
Did the existence of the Wright patent, and the persistence of
litigation regarding it, discourage would-be investors? Did the
high likelihood of being sued for infringement drive small and
independent inventors into other fields of research? These may
well have been factors which are responsible for the incredibly
small capital investment in aviation and the retardation of tech-
nological development in American aviation.72 It is difficult and
speculative to explain the relationship between patent issuance,
infringement litigation, and capital investment, but the lack of
technological progress is a well-established and documented
fact.
While economists may well differ over the relationship be-
tween patents and market domination, another less quantifiable
factor must be considered. As the inventors of the first powered
flying machine, the Wright Brothers occupied a preeminent
place in early aviation. Unquestionably, they did not lack for
challengers since a number of inventors were very close to pro-
ducing a stable machine capable of sustained flight and maneu-
ver. Between the first flight in 1903 and the issuance of their
70 VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 215-16. Roy Knabenshue asked the House Com-
mittee of Patents what a patent meant: "Have you received anything of value, or is
the patent just an excuse to plunge you into a lawsuit with some other inven-
tor...?" POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 114.
71 SCHMOOKLER, supra note 64, at 38-39, 44-45.
72 Tom D. Crouch, a biographer of the Wright brothers and a recognized au-
thority on early American aviation, rejects the possibility that the patent litigation
was responsible for retarding technological development. See TOM D. CROUCH &
PETER L. JAKAB, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THE INVENTION OF THE AERIAL AGE
168-204 (2003).
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patent in 1906, the Wright brothers were the only inventors of a
powered flying machine capable of sustained flight, and Wilbur
Wright's first demonstration flights in France coupled with the
1909 U.S. Army acceptance trials in the United States left no
doubt of their achievement. This preeminence provided a lead-
ership position in early aeronautics that was rapidly eroded by
the patent litigation. While it is speculative to consider how avia-
tion would have developed in the absence of the Wright patent
litigation, it is not unreasonable to suggest that in different cir-
cumstances, and with other personality considerations, early
American aviation might have been considerably more rapid in
its technical development.
G. THE DECLINE OF WRIGHT COMPANY AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
The Wright's seventeen-year patent term expired in 1923, and
eight of those years were expended in prosecuting the Herring-
Curtiss suit to completion. In August 1914, war broke out in Eu-
rope, creating a brisk demand for all types of aircraft, and nu-
merous American aviation manufacturing firms sprang up to
supply national and international orders. The first substantial
U.S. Army procurement of aircraft was made in the summer of
1916 in response to the disastrous operations of the First Aero
Squadron in the Mexican Punitive Expedition. The Curtiss Mo-
tor Company was awarded that substantial contract, but the
Wright-Martin Company, successor to the Wright brothers' pat-
ent interests, was virtually eliminated from the United States
government's aircraft procurement operations.73
Ironically, in 1912 and 1913, as the Wright Company began to
lose its share in government aircraft procurement, Orville
Wright had begun to buy out the shareholders. In December
1915, he reorganized the company, sold his investment to a
group of investors, and became the company's chief consulting
engineer. The reorganized company continued to lose money,
and in 1916, it was merged into the Wright-Martin Company.
When Glenn Martin withdrew in 1917, the resulting Wright Aer-
onautical Company became one of the largest producers of air-
plane engines in the post-war years.74
The declining economic position of the Wrights and their
companies is puzzling, given their position as the foremost
figures in aeronautics after the Army trials of 1908 and Wilbur
73 See discussion of aircraft procurement, JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 107-14.
74 CROUCH, supra note 5, at 464-67; CROUCH & JAKAB, supra note 72, at 204.
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Wright's triumphant tour of France in the same year. The Aero
Club of America was composed of wealthy industrials and finan-
ciers. By virtue of their Aero Club membership and their flying
expertise, the Wrights in these years could easily have tapped
into that wide and well-heeled networking system.75
The membership rosters of the Aero Club included Judge
Elbert H. Gary of U.S. Steel, Colonel Gustav Pabst, the brewer,
as well as M. Robert Guggenheim of the American Smelting and
Refining Company. Others of independent wealth included
John Jacob Astor, Charles J. Glidden, Pierre Lorillard, Jr., and
Harry P. Whitney.76 While a belated resort to secrecy by the
Wrights may have alienated some wealthy Aero Club members,
it is even more likely that the Club's potential as a source of
financial support eroded because of the Wrights' decision to sue
exhibition and contest aviators along with those who promoted
their activities.
Infringement suits against exhibition and contest promoters
arose because the Wrights experienced difficulty in serving pro-
cess and thus obtaining jurisdiction over the pilots themselves.
As noted earlier, exhibitions and contests were held for short
periods of time, and then quickly moved on to other states or
territories subject to other U.S. District Courts. While the pilots
and their equipment moved, the individuals who financed their
activities, as well as those who sponsored the exhibitions and
contests, remained in one place and thus were more susceptible
to service of process.7 7 In this instance, shrewd lawyering jeop-
ardized the hunt for financing the Wrights' invention into a
marketable and mass produced commodity.
Also of relevance was the political struggle within the Aero
Club of America, which by 1910 had spun off the Aeronautical
Society of America, composed of pilots and airplane manufac-
turers, who sought to free themselves from the socialites and
others who were indifferent to the scientific aspects of avia-
75 On the Aero Club and the "aeronaut constituency," see JOHNSON, supra note
22, at 13-19.
76 Id. at 14-15. Dr. Tom Crouch points out that shortly after the Herring-Cur-
tiss complaint was filed, the Wrights, in conjunction with Clinton R. Peterkin and
J. P. Morgan, moved forward to form the Wright Company. Among the inter-
ested individuals were Cornelius Vanderbilt, August Belmont, and Judge Elbert
Gary. Belmont and Gary were Aero Club members. Later, RobertJ. Collier, the
publisher, joined the group at Wilbur Wright's suggestion. CROUCH & JAKAB,
supra note 72, at 190.
77 JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 99.
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tion.78 Immediately upon establishing itself as a rival to the
Aero Club, the Aeronautical Society ordered its first airplane
from Glenn Curtiss. This seriously undermined the possibility
of investment by members of the Aero Club, and it also aligned
Curtiss and his supporters with the scientific and technical en-
thusiasts who demanded more concerted and well-informed ef-
forts toward the development of American aviation. For better
or for worse, the Wrights and the Aero Club continued to main-
tain close ties, and the Wrights became tagged with the non-
scientific and dilettante reputation of the Aero Club. Such a
reputation would generate caution among the financial giants
of the Aero Club, despite the Club's close affiliation with the
Wrights in their licensing activities.
Public sources of funding for aviation might utilize two meth-
ods. One was tax-supported procurement of airplanes by the
federal government, primarily for the Army and Navy. While
the Aero Club of America publicists excoriated Congress for fail-
ure to support aviation at the level common to most other world
powers, the U.S. taxation system was inadequate to support such
a program. Before the 1913 amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion sanctioned the introduction of a graduated income tax, the
United States government was wholly dependent upon customs
duties and internal excise taxes for its revenue. Efforts to imple-
ment a graduated income tax had met with constitutional objec-
tions, and even after 1913, the tax rate was modest until national
needs during the First World War created a broad based source
for the imposition of taxes. 79 Thus situated, the United States
government was incapable of supporting an ambitious aircraft
procurement program for the Army and Navy. To make matters
worse, President Taft, in 1910, initiated a new system of budget-
ing, which, due to misunderstandings between the executive de-
partments and Congress, resulted in drastic reductions in
appropriations for 1911 and 1912.8"
78 Id. at 21-23. These developments are traced in greater detail in BILL ROBIE,
FOR THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT: A HISTORY OF THE AERO CLUB OF AMERICAN AND
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTIC ASSOCIATION, 44-45, 51, 65 (1993). After 1910, the
Aero Club, which licensed all contests and exhibitions in the U.S., had an agree-
ment with the Wrights that it would sanction only exhibitions and contests the
Wrights had approved. The Wright Company agreed to license only those local
promoters approved by Aero Club. CROUCH, supra note 5, at 418.
79 CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPEN-
DITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 387-88, 416-22 (1986).
80 JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 52-55, 82-83.
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The other public source for funding was a subscription cam-
paign. Publicly funded subscriptions in Germany covered most
of the cost of a Zeppelin and equipment in 1909 ($112,000
U.S.), and even raised enough to offset the expense of a 1912
model of a Zeppelin, with its special motorized hanger, costing
in excess of $640,000.81 Yet the success of these appeals to the
German people undoubtedly was attributable to patriotism fol-
lowing German success in the Franco-Prussian War, and also to
the intense arms race that dominated European diplomacy
since 1905. Perhaps taking its cue from the German national
subscriptions, the Aero Club attempted to raise money to
purchase the Wright's patent in 1908; it collected only $11,000
toward the $100,000 price established by the Wrights . 2 Clearly
the Aero Club was unable to gather a modicum of support for
the purchase of the Wright patent, and that failure took place in
1908 when there was little doubt that Wright aircraft could fly
for considerable distances, bank and turn, and then land safely.
By 1910, the Aero Club of America, and hence the aviation com-
munity in general, was riven with sharp disagreements and dis-
sension, and the Wrights appeared to have affiliated themselves
with the least scientific members of the Aero Club. They had
also sued the promoters of foreign aviators, earned the hostility
of a substantial segment of the aeronautical world, and antago-
nized American businessmen who might otherwise have in-
vested in the Wrights and their new invention.
Dr. Tom Crouch has advanced a strong argument that lack of
governmental funding, rather than patent litigation, was the rea-
son for slow development of American aviation after 1909.3
That may well be a contributing factor to the failure of the
United States to match European progress, but it is also true
that until the ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913,
sufficient federal revenues could not be raised for that purpose.
On the other hand, it is plausible that private investor and con-
sumer confidence was shaken by the pendency of the aviation
patent suits, depleting non-governmental encouragement for
aeronautical development.
81 Id. at 83.
82 Id. at 96.
83 CROUCH, supra note 5, at 295-98. Much more persuasive is Dr. Crouch's
point that basic research on aerodynamics and aeronautics was early in its incep-
tion, and much further in advancement in Europe, than in the United States. Id.
at 293-95.
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Even within the slender American market for airplanes, the
Wrights were losing ground to their competitors. In December
1920, the Wright Aeronautical Company reported that less than
19 percent of its revenues had been obtained from patents, and
that in the years since 1917, less than eight percent of income
was derived from patents. Between 1917 and 1920, the Wright
Company's successor, the Wright-Martin Company, was a mem-
ber of the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association, from which it re-
ceived the largest allocation of pooled patent royalties. For the
same time period, a successor Wright firm asserted that since
1917 it had been the largest American manufacturer of aircraft
engines.84 However, the design and sale of airplanes rather than
aeronautical engines, was the field in which the Wright patent
once gave priority to its owners and licensees.
Without access to the Wright Company's financial records, we
cannot be certain about the volume of its aircraft production or
sales. However, Ernest L. Jones, an avid aviation magazine edi-
tor and collector of flying data, provides us with some insight
into the decline of the Wright manufacturing enterprise. His
manuscripts indicate that the Army purchased airplanes from
the Wright Company in 1909, 1911, and 1912. The 1912 pro-
curement was of eight airplanes, but thereafter only one Wright
Company plane was purchased in 1914. The new Naval aviation
branch purchased one Wright plane in 1911 and one in 1912;
thereafter it restricted procurement to Curtiss airplanes. By
1916, the Army was buying 74 airplanes from the Curtiss Aero-
nautical Company, but none from the Wrights. In addition, by
1916 several new manufacturers had entered the American mar-
ket and only the Burgess Aircraft Company operated with a
Wright license."5
Preoccupation with patent litigation seems td have been one
of the major factors in the declining place of the Wright compa-
nies in airplane production. The evidence would suggest that
after 1910, the Wrights neglected further developments in air-
plane design or in their control system. Grover C. Loening, a
Columbia University graduate in aeronautical engineering, was
associated with the Wright Company from June 1913 to the fall
of 1914. He left to accept a position at the Army flying field at
84 Clipping of advertisement, 1917 (on file with Library of Congress in
container 81, Wright Brothers Papers).
85 See the tables and text materials in JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 108-13. Dr.
Crouch cites differing figures which also reflect the rapid decline of U.S. Army
and U.S. Navy acquisition of Wright aircraft. CROUCH, supra note 5, at 290-91.
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North Island near San Diego. Loening's correspondence docu-
ments the inability of the Wright Company to engineer a flying
boat for military or naval use. His efforts to produce a sea-going
airplane design were, according to him, frustrated by Orville
Wright's insistence that the plane not resemble the seaplane de-
veloped by the Curtiss Company. 6 Having prevailed as a plain-
tiff in infringement litigation, Orville Wright was reluctant to
put himself in the awkward position of defending against a Cur-
tiss infringement suit.
The declining industrial position of the Wright Company and
its successors, due in no small degree to Orville Wright's preoc-
cupation with patent litigation, doomed the Wrights' fate in the
field of airplane construction, and spread suspicion among its
own employees and throughout the industry. As the companies
fell behind in the advance of technology, other manufacturers
stepped forward to consolidate their competitive position. In
the end, Orville Wright was able to retire on the monies he had
received through the sale of the Wright Company, but it fell to
other airplane manufacturers to sustain American aviation dur-
ing World War I and thereafter.8 7
II. AMERICAN PATENT LAW, 1906-1918
Although Orville Wright may have been mistaken when he
predicted that their victory would give them a monopoly, he was
correct in his conclusion that holding a pioneering patent pro-
vided a strong position from which to defend their technologi-
cal position. When the Wrights commenced their suit against
Glenn Curtiss, it was well-established that the holder of a pio-
neering patent was entitled to a broad interpretation of the
claimed invention, and that individuals who discovered improve-
ments upon the pioneering invention would have to secure a
license from the pioneer patentee before using their modifica-
tion or improvement of the original pioneering mechanism.
Federal courts agreed that a pioneering patent was one that
"[covered] . . .a function never before performed, a wholly
novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark
a distinct step forward in the art .. .a8 Furthermore, the pio-
86 Letters from Grover Loening to Orville Wright, June 22, 1910, Aug. 1, 1913,
Aug. 15, 1913 (on file with Library of Congress in folio Loening, Wright Brothers
Papers); see alsoJoHNSON, supra note 22, at 101-02.
87 CROUCH, supra note 5, at 288; CROUCH & JAKAB, supra note 72, at 204.
88 Boyden Power-Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, at 561-62; see also Singer Mfg. Co. v.
Cramer, 192 U.S. 265, at 276 (1904); L.A. Art Organ Co. v. Aeolian Co., 143 F.
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neering patent was not limited by specific claims made within
the patent describing the mode of achieving the overall pioneer-
ing objective. 9 Thus, those who improved upon the pioneering
invention were subordinated to the broader claim of the pri-
mary patent. As the U.S. Supreme Court commented in 1876,
"if one inventor precedes all the rest, and strikes out something
which includes and underlies all that they produce, he acquires
a monopoly, and subjects them to tribute."9 ° To the Wrights,
and indeed to most patent attorneys in 1910, it may well have
appeared to be the fact that the holder of a pioneering patent
controlled the gate to technological improvement in the field.
But change was in the wind.
A. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
When the Wrights commenced their infringement suit against
Herring-Curtiss, the federal courts were accustomed to treating
patent law as a separate sphere, particularly in regard to the re-
cently enacted Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.1 The Patent Act
of 1790 still controlled the issuance and judicial construction of
U.S. patents, but the century between the two Congressional ac-
tions had witnessed considerable economic growth, coupled
with increasing confrontations between governmental power
and private enterprise.
The Sherman Antitrust Act's broad provisions made it illegal
to enter into contracts, combinations or conspiracies that would
restrain either interstate or foreign commerce. Although the
thrust of the prohibition was directed toward eliminating mo-
nopolies, Congress neglected to take into consideration govern-
mentally authorized monopolies-those arising under the
patent laws. Patents were not mentioned in the Sherman Act,
leaving federal courts free to speculate whether patents and the
rights they conferred were excluded from the provisions of the
Sherman Act. One of the most hotly contested patent issues im-
mediately prior to the issuance of the Wright patent was the con-
880, 884 (9th Cir. 1906); Autopiano Co. v. Amphion Piano Player Co., 186 F. 159,
163 (2d Cir. 1911).
89 L.A. Art Organ Co., 143 F. at 883-84.
90 Morley Sewing-Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 303 (1889) (quoting
Justice Joseph Bradley for the Court in Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554, 556
(1876)).
91 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2003); see Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property: from Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
167, 168-72 (1997).
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flict between patent rights and the enforcement of antitrust
laws. Critics of the patent system charged that it gave patent
holders complete control over the distribution and sales of new
inventions. Many urged that a system of mandatory licensing be
adopted, compelling patentees to issue licenses to use the inven-
tion when three years had elapsed from the date of the patent.
In 1902, Congress had rejected such a statute, but the proposal
continued to be raised in Congress.92
As the first decade of the twentieth century concluded, de-
mands for governmental regulation of economic activity in-
creased. The Roosevelt and Taft Administrations made effective
use of the Sherman Act to restrain price-fixing, and monopolis-
tic combinations and contracts. 93 Yet the isolation of patent mo-
nopolies from Sherman Act review continued, arousing both
public and Congressional pressure for an altered policy toward
patentees and their privileges. During the first years of the
Wright v. Herring-Curtiss litigation the Oldfield Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives was actively involved in a review
of the patent system and its impact upon creativity in invention
and competition within the economy. Appointed in 1912 to
consider revision of the patent code, the Oldfield Committee
accomplished a great deal by publicizing the monopolistic im-
pact of the patent laws, but none of its proposals were enacted
into law. From late April to August of 1912, the committee held
twenty-seven hearings at which a number of witnesses testified,
and on August 8, it reported out the proposed legislation and
recommended passage.94 Noting that there was widespread
public dissatisfaction with the operation of patent laws, it recom-
mended three remedies: (1) limit the absolute right of a paten-
tee to determine the extent and manner in which a patented
article might be used, (2) limit the practice of tying (that is,
prohibiting the use of the patented article without utilizing un-
92 The vagueness inherent in the terms of the Sherman Act, is noted in Wiu,
LIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 4 (1956); see MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECON-
OMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 107-08 (1990);
see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 87-93 (2d ed. 1998) (tracing the judicial
tendency to cast strong protections around private property rights after 1880).
93 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-
1910 128-34 (1995) (providing a good terse discussion of U.S. v. Trans-Missouri
Freight, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197
(1904), and Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375 (1905)).
94 H.R. REP. No. 62-1161, at 1 (1912).
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patented material provided by the patentee), and (3) limit the
ability of a patentee to suppress the use of the patent, or to use
the patent to prohibit competition by owners of other patents. 5
The committee's proposals also addressed the patenting pro-
cess and inequities that arose from its operation. One practice
was the long drawn out method of obtaining a patent, during
which time the would-be patentee held priority over all subse-
quent filers, and also continued to have his application treated
as confidential information until the patent was issued. In the
Selden case, an extremely long delay in completing an automo-
bile patent application had threatened Henry Ford with an in-
fringement suit by a supposed inventor who had never built an
automobile.96 To deal with this problem the Oldfield Commit-
tee recommended that a patent be issued for a term of nineteen
years, beginning at the date of filing. It was believed that two
years was more than adequate time in which to complete an ap-
plication, and that from that time, the patentee might deduct
the delay occasioned by Patent Office consideration of the appli-
cant's submissions. The committee also addressed the practice
of "shelving" a patent, which was simply holding the patent and
not putting it to use, with the purpose of preventing others from
providing the invention to the public. Pointing out that shelv-
ing was against the general practice of other nations, they sug-
gested that a period of three or four years should be established
during which the patented article should be made available to
the public. If that were not done, the patent should either be
forfeited, or subjected to a mandatory licensing system.97
Some of the Oldfield Committee recommendations, if en-
acted into law, would have alleviated many of the Wrights' diffi-
culties with patent litigation. The report asserted:
The failure of our law to provide adequate means of determining
and enforcing patent rights detracts greatly from the value of pat-
ents to inventors and others interested. It often results also in
depriving the public of the benefits which would flow from the
development of inventions... Large capital thus becomes neces-
sary, not for the development of the invention, but to protect
it.98
95 Id. at 2.
96 ROSEBERRY, supra note 51, at 343-45.
97 Id. at 4-7.
98 Id. at 24.
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The Committee suggested that the trial process should be
shortened by limiting testimony to matters that were material to
the case, and that evidence taken before an examiner was not
adequate preparation for the judge who would be called upon
to decide the case. In addition, the Committee pointed out that
a specialized court of patent appeals would centralize the appel-
late process, and thereby eliminate conflicts between the various
circuit courts of appeal. Removing patent litigation from the
general federal appellate system would, in the Committee's
opinion, sharply limit the number of patent appeals taken to the
U.S. Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. 9
The Oldfield Committee's point was well taken. The struc-
ture of the federal court system coupled with the unique charac-
teristics of the U.S. patent system made infringement litigation
hazardous, even for the well-established inventor or manufac-
turer. The application procedures were cumbersome and
lengthy. A classic case of the day involved the so-called Selden
patent upon a gasoline powered motor vehicle. The application
had been filed in 1879, but the patenting procedure was drawn
out so that the patent was not issued until 1895, when several
manufacturers had entered the field relying upon their patents
dating well after 1879. Since an application and all information
concerning the invention are kept confidential by the Patent Of-
fice until the patent is issued, other inventors working on a simi-
lar invention may not be aware of the pendency of the
application. This was the situation in regard to the Selden pat-
ent. However, once the patent is issued, it takes priority by vir-
tue of its filing date, and may well supercede similar patents
issued in the interim. In the Selden situation, Henry Ford was
perhaps the only automobile manufacturer willing to challenge
George Selden. His attorney, W. Benton Crisp, succeeded in
convincing the court that Selden's priority was based upon an
inequitable misuse of the patenting procedure, and thus broke
the stalemate introduced by the Selden infringement action.10
Patent infringement suits were tried in the United States Cir-
cuit Courts, where expert testimony was introduced by both
sides, frequently in the form of deposition hearings held before
trial. Judges unfamiliar with technical terminology were thus
confronted with a large file of documentary evidence and steno-
99 Id. at 21-23.
100 The Selden patent imbroglio is well explained in CROUCH, supra note 5, at
461-62; ROSEBERRY, supra note 51, at 344-46.
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graphic records of expert testimony. Appeals from their deci-
sions might be taken to the circuit courts of appeal, which were
authorized to review district and circuit court decisions within
their multi-state circuits. Unfortunately for patent litigants, the
circuit court of appeals rulings settled the law only within their
circuit. Absent the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, cir-
cuit courts of appeal decisions were binding precedent within
the circuit; conversely, they were merely persuasive precedents
in all other federal courts. This uncertainty encouraged in-
fringement in states where the patent's validity had not been
litigated. In the Wrights' situation, it also demanded close mon-
itoring of aviation inventions in all of the federal circuits. These
legal complexities suggest that while the Wright patent wars may
have been complicated by a number of factors, there were also
institutional and legal barriers to success in defending patent
rights and to achieving profitability. Challenges of this nature
faced virtually every inventor who held a U.S. patent, and partic-
ularly those who held "pioneering" patents on basic inventions.
Undaunted by their lack of success in the 1912-13 legislative
sessions, members of the Oldfield Committee returned to the
work of revision in 1914. However, as their report indicates, the
conflict between antitrust law and patent monopolies was with-
drawn from their reported bill since it was incorporated in the
bill which would ultimately be passed as the Clayton Antitrust
Act. Section three of the Clayton Act specifically made patented
goods subject to the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10'
This effectively ended the exclusion of patented goods from the
provisions of the Sherman Act, leaving it to the federal courts to
determine what rules were applicable to monopolistic practices
that were based upon patent grants. As recent commentators
suggest, American patent law no longer was a separate and dis-
tinct sphere from the antitrust laws. Rather, there was a tension
between the two lines of statutory materials, which the courts
were charged with interpreting.10 2 Future Wright patent litiga-
tion thus was thrust into a new phase of antitrust/patent law.
Amidst the uncertainty engendered by this significant statutory
change, there was one certainty: many of the earlier issues con-
cerning the business practices of patentees and their licensees
would be subject to careful examination in the years to follow.
101 H. R. REP. No. 63-1082, at 1 (1914); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (West
2003).
102 Tom & Newberg, supra note 91, at168-73.
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B. JUDICIAL MODIFICATIONS IN PATENT/ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
The U. S. Supreme Court, during the Chief Justiceship of
Melville W. Fuller (1888-1910), established a high standard of
patentability, stressing the genius or invention represented by
the patent being examined. At the same time, the Court em-
phasized the property rights of inventors, and viewed patents as
being contractual in nature. In exchange for public disclosure
in the approved patent application, the patentee was entitled to
a limited monopoly. Furthermore, patent holders were entitled
to fix the price of patented articles, and to assign rights to resell
that were conditioned upon the transferees charging a stipu-
lated price.1" 3
Patent law treatises affirmed the monopolistic power con-
ferred by the award of a patent. Walter Rogers, writing as of
January 1914, noted that in Bement v. National Harrow Co., the
Supreme Court had awarded damages to a patentee based upon
a price-fixing clause entered into after the enactment of the
Sherman Act. In addition he quoted the District Judge's opin-
ion in the Bathtub Case, U.S. v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing
Co., where it was asserted that
All men know that congress never intended when it passed the
Sherman act to change the patent law. It did not do so . . .The
right to exclude others is the property of the patentee. It is his
very own. He may do with it as he will."'
Rogers asserted that "the general rule is the absolute freedom
in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United
States."10 5 Rogers's assertion of the patentee's paramount prop-
erty rights might have been stated more forcefully than this evi-
dence suggested to him. In his preface, he noted that he
delayed publication so that he might include important cases
decided in 1912 and 1913, and that even with the delay, "It goes
to press at the end of a period of discussion of cases involving
important principles.. ."106 Indeed, William W. Thornton's trea-
tise on the Sherman Antitrust Act drew quite a different view of
the state of patent and antitrust law. While Thornton acknowl-
edged that a patentee had authority to sell or not to sell the use
103 ELY, supra note 92, at 207-09.
104 WALTER F. ROGERS, THE LAW OF PATENTS AS ILLUSTRATED BY LEADING CASES
1290, 1302, 1303, 1313 (1914).
105 Id. at 1307.
106 The preface is dated Jan. 12, 1914, well before the enactment of the Clay-
ton Act. Id. at iii.
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of his patent, or even to suppress its use until the patent ex-
pired, he nevertheless found precedents which made it clear
that if contracts concerning patents restrained interstate trade,
they were subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act. Al-
though a patentee might fix the price at which his transferee
sold the use of the patented item, he might not control prices
charged by more remote vendees. Furthermore, a patentee's
rights did not include the privilege to sell or use the patented
item in a manner that was contrary to state law. In other words,
Thornton was arguing that the mere possession of a patent did
not confer exemption from state laws; by analogy, neither did it
confer immunity from the operation of federal laws like the
Sherman Act. Finally, he pointed out that combinations based
upon the ownership of independent patents might be seen to
eliminate competition or restrain trade, and thus violate the
Sherman Act.10 7
Prior to 1914, the Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. U.S.
antitrust case 1 8 represented a new trend in the relationship be-
tween the patent laws and the Sherman Act. The 1899 patent
recognized James Arnott's discovery of a new method for apply-
ing enamel to metal plumbing fixtures, including the interior of
bath tubs. By the time the government brought a suit, over 85
percent of the bathtubs sold within the United States were sub-
ject to a vertical price-fixing arrangement controlled by the
Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company, the patent's as-
signee. In announcing the Supreme Court's decision,Justice Jo-
seph McKenna refused to permit a patent owner to control
prices beyond those set by his immediate vendees. 109 In effect,
the decision was a significant step toward eliminating the patent-
based exception to the provisions of the Sherman Act. As such,
it gave pause to the antitrust bar, and heralded the more sweep-
ing statutory revisions made by the Clayton Act in 1914. In addi-
tion to this price-fixing patent arrangement, the lower courts in
1912 were examining a tying arrangement involving patented
107 WILLIAM W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 617-
18, 621, 625-31, 633, 643 (1913) (citing Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 166 F. 555, 561 (C.C. Mass. 1909) and suggesting possible changes in the
precedent established in the pro-patentee tying case of Henry v. A. B. Dick & Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912), a 4-3 decision by an under-staffed Court)).
108 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co v. U.S., 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
109 Id. at 35, 37; see also WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER ED-
WARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910-1921 80, 82 (1999). For the pivotal position of the
Standard Sanitary case see Tom & Newberg, supra note 91, at 170.
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shoe machinery. These cases, which would reach the Supreme
Court in 1922 as United Shoe Machinery Co. v. U.S., involved a ty-
ing arrangement whereby United Shoe, as owner of a patented
shoe making machine, refused to sell or license that machine to
shoe makers who did not used other products made by United
Shoe or its subsidiaries. For antitrust specialists, including trea-
tise writer William Thornton, these were portents of a revolution
in judicial philosophy concerning patents and monopolies. 110
Since the Wrights were primarily involved in infringement liti-
gation in 1914, these indications of changing judicial attitudes
toward patents were certainly not in the foreground of their at-
tention. However, to the extent that the provisions of the Sher-
man Act might limit the previous freedom of patentees to
monopolize a field, astute observers were predicting the devel-
opment of new law in the field of patents and antitrust law.
That prospect, coupled with the possibility of legislative enact-
ments, created uncertainty that encouraged litigation. Law that
was reasonably stable in 1909 and 1910 when the Wrights filed
their infringement suits, began to enter an era of change. This
was something that neither the Wrights nor their legal advisors
could predict.111
III. THE WRIGHT PATENT, THE PATENT POOL AND
THE MANUFACTURERS' AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION
After the outbreak of World War I in Europe (August 1914),
the demand for military aircraft soared, and American firms
with production facilities were enticed by potential profits to
produce airplanes despite the threat of Wright infringement ac-
tions. Glenn Curtiss and others spent extraordinary amounts of
time on research, attempting to develop control systems that
would not infringe upon the Wright patent. However, the
broad and liberal construction of the Wright patent as a "pio-
neering invention" doomed their efforts to failure in the courts.
This persisted until the July 1917 formation of a patent pool be-
tween Curtiss, successors to the Wrights' interests, and other
inventors. 112
In times of peace, patent litigation might be tolerated by a
government driven by budgetary conservatism and lulled into a
110 PRATT, supra note 109, at 81-82. On Thornton, see discussion supra note 92.
111 Unfortunately, this change in antitrust law and the resulting economic con-
sequences have not received scholarly attention.
112 WRIGHT PAPERS, supra note 8, at 1087, n. 10.
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false sense of diplomatic and military isolation from world af-
fairs. Things changed radically even before April 1917 when the
United States declared war on the German Empire. A year
before, in the aftermath of the Mexican Punitive Expedition,
Congress had appropriated $15,000,000 for the purchase of air-
planes, but patent litigation among the fifteen active manufac-
turers held up full production. Some like the Wright-Martin
Company (the transferee of the basic Wright patent of 1906)
demanded large royalties from the others. Its patience ex-
hausted, Congress passed a statute authorizing the condemna-
tion of all basic aviation patents and appropriated funds to
compensate the owners. This threat finally brought the aircraft
builders to their senses. Through the intercession of the Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), a govern-
mental board assembled to advance scientific study of
aeronautics, the manufacturers were brought together in April
1917 to discuss the possibility of forming a patent pool. Patent
pools are utilized when a patent block develops because key pat-
ents are held by competing firms, and none can conduct busi-
ness without infringing another's patent.11
The Wright-Martin Company, holding the basic Wright pat-
ent, was extremely reluctant to enter the pool, and their deter-
mination mirrored the attitude of the rival Curtiss firm.
However, the governmental threat of condemning the patents
forced them and the other manufacturers to agree. A Manufac-
turers' Aircraft Association (MAA) was established in July 1917,
and each manufacturing firm was permitted to join upon pay-
ment of a $1,000 initiation fee. Each airplane built by member
firms or by independent manufacturers, was to be subject to a
$200 fee, considerably less than the Wright Company's usual
royalty of $1,000 per airplane. However, the Wrights were to
receive $135 as their share; Curtiss was to receive $40, and the
remaining $25 was used to pay small royalties to the other pat-
ent holders and to cover administrative costs of the Associa-
tion.'14 To facilitate wartime production even further, the U.S.
113 JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 114-15, 189-91; VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 65;
POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 4-6, 96; TOULMIN, supra note 17, at 52.
114 POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 3-6, 96, 548, 557, 776, 818 (testimony
of Billy Mitchell, James V. Martin, Attorney Willis B. Rice, MAA President Frank
H. Russell); VAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 64-65, 304; VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at 34,
35; ROBIE, supra note 78, at 96. The details of the MAA pool agreement, and
subsequent alterations of the royalty terms during and after World War I are set
forth in Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S., 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1933).
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government undertook to hold harmless any member of the
MAA and any independent manufacturer who might be sued for
patent infringement which occurred while filling government
purchase orders. Thus, private manufacturers were forced to
prosecute infringement suits against the government in the fed-
eral Court of Claims, rather than against the actual infringer in
the U.S. district trial courts. 115
The MAA pool restored a modicum of peace to the troubled
aircraft production industry during World War I, but it could
not guarantee fair competition. Neither could it end resort to
the courts by patent holders. Litigation and outright infringe-
ment was too well entrenched to be totally abandoned. After
the war, the Wright firm brought an infringement action against
Handley-Page, a British firm which operated at home under the
Crown license, but which was forced to build DH-4s (the "flam-
ing coffin") in the United States during the war. The Wrights
sued for an injunction and damages for infringing the United
States patent, presumably because of the place of production. 16
The possibilities of trans-national evasion of U.S. patent restric-
tions were brought to Orville Wright's attention even before the
United States entered the war. In 1915, Orville Wright sent Roy
Knabenshue to examine Curtiss aircraft being constructed in
Buffalo, and subsequently in Toronto. Knabenshue reported
that none of the airplanes had ailerons, and therefore they did
not infringe the Wrights' U.S. patent. However, the Wright
Company later discovered that when the aircraft were delivered
in England, and thus, ostensibly covered by the Crown license,
the British government installed ailerons. 1 7
Within the United States, the MAA came under strong attack
after the armistice was signed in November 1918. While inde-
pendent manufacturers and others involved in aviation were
willing to tolerate the Association's monopolistic control in the
interest of the war effort, their tolerance was exhausted with the
return of peace. A series of congressional investigations looked
into patent pooling in general, and their attention was regularly
drawn to the aircraft patent pool administered by the MAA.
The 1935 congressional inquiry deduced extensive testimony
concerning the antitrust aspects of the MAA's operations as a
115 VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at 64, 65.
116 See the litigation papers, ca. 1920 (on file with the Library of Congress in
container 81, Wright Brothers Papers).
117 POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 113.
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patent pool. The best-known witness against the MAA was for-
mer Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, who was subsequently
sued for libel by the MAA.1l 8 Engineer Edward F. Chandler tes-
tified before the House Committee, asserting that "[t] he build-
ing of patent monopolies by the formation of strongly financed
pools handicapped the smaller manufacturer, and in time will
eliminate from many fields of activity the trade stimulus of legiti-
mate competition." ' Inventor Waldemar Kaempffert admitted
that patent pooling may in some instances be a way of moving
forward rapidly with a new invention, but he felt that it generally
was an abuse of the patent system that led to self-perpetuating
monopolies and unfair competition. James V. Martin, who had
invented a retractable landing gear prior to the war, testified
that it would have been available during the war but that it had
been rejected by the influence of "the crooked brokers and
bankers in this Manufacturers Aircraft Association."' 20 Martin
claimed that the MAA resorted to criminal intimidation, even
murder, to accomplish its monopolistic aims. General Mitchell
asserted that the MAA was wholly responsible for the wartime
failures of the aviation industry, and that industrialist Henry
Ford closed his airplane engine factory because he would not
join the MAA, which hounded him until he stopped production
at his factory.12 1
The 1935 Congressional inquiry also produced some startling
testimony concerning aircraft procurement during World War I
through what today would be considered a "military industrial
complex" verging on a criminal conspiracy to evade government
procurement regulations. General Mitchell's testimony was very
specific and credible, but doubtless, its weight was discounted by
the American public's recollection of his 1925 court-martial and
the possibility that this may have clouded his judgment. The
former commander of aviation for General Pershing's AEF
stated that military officers were afraid to testify against the
118 Mitchell challenged the law of the libel suit, but lost his demurrer motion
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Mitchell, 10 F. Supp. 91, 94 (E.D. Va. 1935). This is the last reported record of
the case, which has received few mentions in case law since 1935. Presumably,
the defamation litigation was either settled or terminated by Mitchell's death
shortly after his motion was decided.
119 POOLING OF PATENTS, supra note 3, at 664.
120 Id. at 61. Martin's testimony charged that Col. E. A. Deeds was the secret
owner of Dayton-Wright Company stock at the same time that he authorized a
U.S. government loan to the Dayton-Wright Company. Id. at 78.
121 Id. at 9, 11, 61, 65, 893.
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MAA, which had lobbyists swarming to protect its interests when-
ever Congress tried to establish the truth. He asserted that from
1906 to 1923 the Wright patent "practically controlled the War
Department in its aeronautical organization.' ' 122 This may have
been a slight exaggeration, since as we have seen, the Army had
begun to abandon Wright aircraft as early as 1913. During the
war, according to Mitchell, the financial manipulators in control
of aircraft production were held in check by the veterans of AEF
aerial operations. However, they soon asserted themselves, and
by 1935, they controlled a major part of the aircraft built in the
United States. He also pointed out that the Aeronautical Cham-
ber of Commerce worked hand-in-hand with the MAA, and that
this group had substantial influence in the higher levels of the
federal government. They had President Herbert Hoover's son
on their payroll, and in a bipartisan gesture, made sure to re-
cruit Elliott Roosevelt for a similar staff position when the Dem-
ocrats took over the White House. According to Mitchell,
President Roosevelt's son promptly resigned from this employ-
ment when he learned what the Aeronautical Chamber of Com-
merce was doing. Mitchell urged that if all government aviation
activities were merged into one administrative branch, the influ-
ence of the MAA and the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce
would be minimized. In addition, he suggested that a formal
bid process be used in the purchase of aircraft, and that the
prevalent practice of buying aircraft through negotiation was
contrary to the government's best interests. 123
Horace Keane provided information that cast doubt on the
legality and effectiveness of all Army aircraft procurement ef-
forts during and after World War I. An independent manufac-
turer of airplanes, Keane told the 1935 House Committee on
Patents that a "Coffin-Deeds gang" dominated aircraft procure-
ment during and subsequent to World War 124 The night after
Keane submitted a design proposal to Air Service procurement
officials, a military officer who was his friend visited him, and
told him that they would like to give him an award, but could
not because of his association with someone who had been
black-listed. Later testimony suggested that the individual in dis-
122 Id. at 16.
123 Id. at 10, 13, 15, 19, 819, 821, 838, 840, 851. Thomas A. Morgan, president
of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce denied Mitchell's allegations, and
asserted that U.S. military and naval aircraft were technologically the equal of
those used by all other nations. Id. at 726-39.
124 Id. at 791-92.
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favor was James Martin. However, Keane's design later was in-
corporated in an Army airplane without any recognition or
payment to him.1 25 It was Keane's opinion, echoed by Martin
and General Billy Mitchell, that the MAA automatically received
all applications submitted to the Air Service Procurement Divi-
sion at McCook Field in Illinois. Unless the applicant was a
member of the MAA, the proposal or application was routinely
rejected regardless of its merit, but the idea might well be incor-
porated in a future aircraft manufactured by an MAA member.
Keane also claimed that the NACA had come under the influ-
ence of bankers and brokers from Detroit, Michigan and Day-
ton, Ohio. This influence was exerted through Colonel Edward
A. Deeds, a wartime officer recruited directly into the Air Ser-
vice from civilian life, and Howard Coffin, the founder of the
Hudson Automobile Company, who had been appointed to
head the Aircraft Production Board at the beginning of the war.
Mitchell referred to the National Advisory Committee on Aero-
nautics as the "bribe committee" because of its activities in con-
nection with aircraft procurement, and he also fingered NACA
as the key to the suppression of aeronautical invention. 126
Neither Mitchell, nor Keane, nor James Martin, were without
ulterior motives in their testimony, yet in the hindsight of his-
tory we might well ask whether even smoke of suspect origin
might not be the sign of a destructive fire in World War I air-
craft procurement. Historian James Hudson noted the confu-
sion in organization and control of the Air Service in general, as
well as the Aircraft Production Bureau, but based on the
Hughes Committee report, he accepted the committee's conclu-
sion that there was no graft or corruption. He also notes that
tension and animosity existed between the combat pilots and
the procurement branch of the Air Service. 1 27
IV. CONCLUSION
The Manufacturers' Aircraft Association failed to eliminate
patent litigation in the aircraft industry; nor did it facilitate
American production of aircraft during World War I, its imme-
125 Id. at 61.
126 Id. at 7, 50, 64, 66, 90, 178, 180, 787, 780-91, 795 (Billy Mitchell testimony,
Feb 14, 1935, James Martin testimony, Mar. 7, 1935, Horace Keane testimony,
Dec. 5, 1935).
127 JAMES J. HUDSON, HOSTILE SKIES: A COMBAT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AIR
SERVICE IN WORLD WAR I 6-10, 14-22 (1968). There should be at least a few doc-
toral dissertations waiting to be written on this topic.
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diate short-term objective. By tacking new patents to the origi-
nal Wright patent, which supposedly expired in 1923, the MAA
perpetuated its existence until the last quarter of the twentieth
century. 121 In 1933 it was still suing the United States govern-
ment to collect amounts it claimed as royalties on aircraft pro-
duced for the government or the allies during World War 1.129
If the MAA was medicine to cure litigation sickness in the air-
craft industry, it may well have been a cure that was more deadly
than the disease. Through authorizing the MAA as a war-time
expedient, the United States Congress created a designated ex-
ception to the antitrust laws, and intentionally chose to assign
the development of aeronautics to a contract, combination and
conspiracy, that had every intention of restricting trade and
commerce in aircraft throughout the United States. If only a
portion of the 1935 Congressional testimony is accurate, it is ap-
parent that the development of military aviation prior to World
War II was severely hindered by self-serving decisions of the
MAA, perhaps augmented by accomplices within the U.S. gov-
ernment. In addition, there were numerous allegations that in-
ventors who came forward with new modes of aircraft
construction were systematically discouraged by government
employees in conjunction with the National Advisory Commit-
tee on Aeronautics and the MAA. Absent extended scholarly
analysis of the inter-war years, we can only speculate how much
additional damage was caused to military and civil aviation by
the existence of the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association.
Few of these consequences of the Wright patent litigation
have been explored at any great length, and all were far from
the minds of those Americans who gathered at Kitty Hawk on
December 17, 2003 to celebrate the "First Flight" centennial.
Indeed, the aeronautical achievement of the Wright Brothers,
historic and memorable as it is, provided only the beginning for
a tragic struggle on their part. It was a contest that they could
not win, for a host of circumstances bedeviled their efforts to
protect their invention and gain well-earned fame and financial
well-being. The United States lacked the funding for govern-
mental procurement or the will to raise private investment to
encourage their work, nor was it ready to support the basic sci-
entific research and engineering essential for full-scale produc-
128 A consent order between the federal government and the Manufacturers'
Aircraft Association is reported unofficially at 1975 WL 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
129 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S., 77 F. Supp. 481 (1933).
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tion of airplanes. The Wrights' conduct of their patent
infringement cases discouraged many would-be investors and
isolated them from the aeronautics community and from the
mainstream of aeronautical development. Distracted by patent
litigation the Wrights and their companies neglected the task of
engineering development, and failed to purchase rights to new
aviation inventions that would have enhanced their economic
position. Perhaps the most ironic turn of events was the altera-
tion of patent and antitrust jurisprudence even as their major
cases worked their way through the federal courts.
While Orville Wright enjoyed a comfortable life as a conse-
quence of his and Wilbur's invention, he must have been embit-
tered by the futile story of the Wright patent litigation and the
decline of the aircraft business he and Wilbur established. In
the end, the Wrights were victims of circumstances far beyond
their control and that was a tragedy-for them and for the
United States.
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